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The Humane Society and Italian Driftnetters:
Environmental Activists and Unilateral Action
in International Environmental Law
Amy Blackwelt
I. Introduction
The global fishing industry has doubled in size since 1970 with
an estimated one million large vessels currently prowling the
world's oceans in search of fish.' The burgeoning fleet is also
becoming increasingly efficient.2 Spotter planes and satellite
positioning systems help locate fish, while automatic trawl nets
and special driftnets snare every bit of significant marine life in a
given area.'
Driftnetting can be an extremely destructive practice.
According to the United Nations Food and Agriculture
Organization, with driftnetting about seventy percent of the
world's marine stock is overexploited, and if current rates of
depletion continue, there will be a shortage of about thirty million
tons of fish by the year 2000.' Moreover, driftnets, which are
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I See Dick Russell, Vacuuming the Seas: Unprecedented Factory Fishing
Operations Have Created a Global Crisis as Species Dwindle and Species Decline, E:
EwrrL. MAG., July-Aug. 1996, at 28. Some experts believe that this fleet is twice the
size of one that can maintain fish populations at a consistent level. See id.
2 See id.
3 See id. United States law describes large scale driftnet fishing as "a method of
fishing in which a gillnet composed of a panel or panels of webbing, or a series of such
gillnets, with a total length of two and one-half kilometers or more is placed in the water
and allowed to drift with the currents and winds for the purpose of entangling fish in the
webbing." 16 U.S.C. § 1826c(2)(A) (1994).
" See Russell, supra note 1, at 28; see also Fisheries: FAO Members Adopt Code
for Responsible Fisheries, Agri Service Int'l, Nov. 10, 1995, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Arcnws File (noting that levels of fish consumption in 1993 were
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usually made of non-biodegradable plastic, indiscriminately catch
almost all marine creatures, including whales, sea turtles, and
birds! Many of these creatures are killed by the driftnets and are
discarded by fishermen.6
Despite the overexploitation, there is good evidence that most
fish populations can recover when intense fishing pressure is
removed.7 During the last decade, fishing nations have made a
semi-concerted effort to limit the use of drifinets. The United
States passed legislation that bans driftnet fishing by American
fishermen and allows for sanctions against other nations that
continue to use driftnets.' In addition, the United Nations has
passed two primary resolutions calling for the reduction of driftnet
fishing, as have regional treaty organizations such as the South
Pacific Forum.9
While these legislative efforts established a necessary legal
framework, enforcement remains the primary problem. The United
Nations' resolutions call for a moratorium on driftnets, but the
United Nations has no enforcement provisions of its own. Instead
it calls on member nations to pass their own legislation to effect
the moratorium.'I Not all countries have done this. In particular,
the members of the European Union have not been willing to ban
approximately 13 kilograms per person and that, due to population expansion, to hold
that level steady through the year 2010, there would have to be a 25% increase in fish
production).
I See id.
6 See Humane Soc'y of the United States v. Brown, 901 F. Supp. 338, 341 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1995) (Humane Soc'y I).
7 See Russell, supra note 1, at 29.
8 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1826, 1826a (1994).
9 See United Nations General Assembly Resolution on Large-Scale Pelagic
Driftnet Fishing and its Impact on the Living Marine Resources of the World's Oceans
and Seas, U.N. GAOR 2nd Comm., 44th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 82(0, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/44/225 (1989), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1555 (1990) [hereinafter Pelagic Driftnet
Fishing I]; United Nations General Assembly Resolution on Large-Scale Pelagic
Driftnet Fishing and its Impact on the Living Marine Resources of the World's Oceans
and Seas, G.A. Res. 215, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Res/46/215 (1992),
reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 241 (1992) [hereinafter Pelagic Driftnet Fishing II]; South Pacific
Forum: Final Act of the Meeting on a Convention to Prohibit Driftnet Fishing in the
South Pacific, 29 I.L.M. 1449 (1990) [hereinafter Wellington Convention].
10 See Pelagic Driftnet Fishing I, supra note 9, at 1558; Pelagic Driftnet Fishing II,
supra note 9, at 242.
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the nets," and several countries, including Italy, have openly
continued to use driftnets.'2
While the driftnet enforcement issue is ostensibly left up to
each individual country, legislation passed by the United States
has proved an unlikely, but effective mechanism for controlling
the use of driftnets worldwide. Congress passed the High Seas
Driftnet Fisheries Enforcement Act (HSDFEA) 3 in 1992, a law
which requires the Secretary of Commerce to identify other
nations that continue to fish with driftnets.' 4 Under the law, once a
country is identified, the President must ask the offending country
to stop using the nets. If the identified country refuses, the
Secretary then must prohibit the import of fish and fish products
from that country." The threat of HSDFEA sanctions serve as
strong encouragement for those nations which depend on the
substantial U.S. fish market.'6  However, for political and
diplomatic reasons, the United States may be hesitant to enforce
the HSDFEA against friendly nations."
Although the United States may be hesitant, the HSDFEA
provides special interest and environmental groups the power to
affect driftnetting worldwide. In the recent past, private
environmental groups have effectively skirted the international
diplomatic barriers by bringing suit in the Court of International
Trade (CIT). 8 The CIT is rapidly becoming a sympathetic forum
II See Fisheries: Bonino Urges Italians to End Use of Drtftnets, EUR. REP., July 6,
1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Eurrpt File [hereinafter Bonino].
12 See id.
13 16 U.S.C. § 1826a (1994).
1' See id. §§ 1826(e)(5), (6).
15 See id.
16 For example, a U.S. embargo on fish products from Italy cost the Italians an
estimated $1 billion per year. See Bonino, supra note 11.
17 See infra notes 194-98 and accompanying text.
18 Since 1980, the CIT has exercised exclusive jurisdiction over actions against the
United States, its agencies or officers, arising out of any U.S. law authorizing embargoes
for reasons other than public health or safety, and actions concerning the administration
and enforcement of these embargoes. See David Paget & Lemuel M. Srolovic,
Protecting Endangered Species: Customs Court Becomes Potent Forum, N.Y. L.J., June
3, 1996, at SI, available in LEXIS, Legenew Library, NYLawJ File. The CIT, formerly
the U.S. Customs Court, has all powers in law and equity exercised by federal district
1998]
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where these groups can successfully force the U.S. government to
enforce its existing environmental laws against other nations.' 9
This is precisely the route taken recently by several American
environmental groups that sought to stop driftnetting by Italian
fishermen." The groups, led by the Humane Society of the United
States, successfully brought an action against the federal
government in the CIT, alleging that the Department of Commerce
had not taken the actions required by the HSDFEA against Italy
after acquiring knowledge of illegal Italian driftnetting.2 The
victory in the CIT forced the Department of Commerce to threaten
sanctions against Italian fish products and persuaded the European
Union to seriously address the driftnet issue.'
The case illustrated the complex way in which federal law,
federal courts, environmental activists, and foreign governments
interact in the field of international environmental law. It offers
some hope that laws can be enforced even by reluctant
governments if they are confronted with enough outside pressure.23
The case also raised questions about the wisdom or feasibility of
taking unilateral action to enforce international law.
This paper begins by examining the United Nations resolutions
on driftnet fishing2' and the related Wellington Convention,25 the
sources of current international law regarding driftnets and the
justification for the United States' involvement in the reduction of
drifinet use worldwide.26 Part III discusses the related HSDFEA,
27
and the current driftnet situation in Europe.28 Part IV examines the
courts. See id. The CIT's nine judges are appointed by the President with advice and
consent of the Senate, and they hold tenure for life. See id. at SI n.2.
19 See infra notes 144-93 and accompanying text.
20 See Humane Soc'y of the United States v. Brown, 901 F. Supp. 338, 338 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1995) (Humane Soc'y I).
21 See id.; infra notes 173-84 and accompanying text.
22 See Bonino, supra note 11.
23 See infra notes 185-90 and accompanying text.
2 See Pelagic Driftnet Fishing I, supra note 9;, Pelagic Driftnet Fishing II, supra
note 9.
25 See Wellington Convention, supra note 9.
26 See infra notes 33-74 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 75-108 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 109-43 and accompanying text.
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the role of the CIT in enforcing environmental regulations,29
focusing particularly on Humane Society.0 By examining these
elements in the context of the Italian driftnet case, this paper
underscores the power of the U.S. government to influence
international environmental policy by unilateral economic
actions. It also demonstrates that private special interest groups
are key players in the process because of their ability to police
driftnetting activity and to use the HSDFEA to force other nations
to comply with the United States' environmental policy.32
II. International Law
A. United Nations Resolutions
In 1989, in hopes of reducing driftnet fishing throughout the
world, the United Nations adopted Resolution 44/225. 33 The
resolution described large-scale pelagic driftnet fishing as "a
method of fishing with a net or combination of nets intended to be
held in a more or less vertical position by floats and weights, the
purpose of which is to enmesh fish by drifting on the surface of or
in the water. 3 4 The drafters of the resolution were concerned about
the presence of more than one thousand vessels using driftnets on
the high seas, while coastal states were concerned that driftnet
fishing was exploiting the resources just outside of their exclusive
economic zones."
The resolution called for regulatory measures that would take
29 See infra notes 144-72 and accompanying text.*
31 See infra notes 173-93 and accompanying text; Humane Soc'y of the United
States v. Brown, 901 F. Supp. 338, 338 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1995) (Humane Soc'y I); Paget
& Srolovic, supra note 18, at SI.
31 See infra notes 194-208 and accompanying text.
32 See infra notes 194-208 and accompanying text
33 See Pelagic Drifinet Fishing I, supra note 9, at 1556.
34 Id.
35 See id. at 1557. According the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea, Article 57, the exclusive economic zone of a nation may extend up to 200 nautical
miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. See
Convention on the Law of the Sea, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982). Article 56 gives the coastal
state sovereign rights to exploit and manage the resources in its exclusive economic
zone, including protecting and preserving the marine environment. See id.
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account of the best scientific data and analysis available. 6 To
achieve the goal of scientific accuracy, the resolution exhorted the
members of the international community to cooperate in collecting
and sharing data and to strengthen cooperation in conserving and
managing living marine resources." It called for a moratorium on
all large-scale pelagic driftnet fishing by June 30, 1992, allowing
for exceptions if necessary.3" It also sought to reduce driftnet
fishing in the Pacific and to halt expansion in other areas.39 Also,
the resolutions sought to have the Secretary General of the United
Nations bring the issue to the attention of the international
community, and sought to have specialized agencies study the
impact of driftnet fishing in accordance with the resolution's
commitment to accurate scientific data.4° The drafters further
recommended that the international community review this data
and agree on regulating and monitoring measures by June 30,
1991.
41
Scientific review after the passage of Resolution 44/225
uncovered some bad news. Researchers predictably found that
driftnet fishing had an adverse impact on the conservation and
sustainable management of living marine resources. 2 Furthermore,
there were concerns about the reports of large-scale pelagic
driftnet fishing activities in direct contravention of Resolution
44/225. 43 As a result, at the end of 1991, the United Nations
adopted Resolution 46/215, which called for a more general
moratorium on driftnet fishing."
While resolution 46/215 commended the unilateral, regional,
and international efforts of many members of the international
community in their implementation of Resolution 44/225, it
nevertheless called for a moratorium on large-scale driftnet




40 See id. at 1559.
41 See id. at 1558.
42 See Pelagic Driftnet Fishing II, supra note 9, at 242.
43 See id. at 241.
44 See id.
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fishing. 5 It called for such a moratorium even though the
moratorium would cause adverse socio-economic consequences.'
Starting on January 1, 1992, members were required to reduce
large-scale pelagic high seas driftnet fisheries by reducing the
number of vessels involved, the length of the nets used, and the
areas open for fishing. Under the resolution, the number of
drifitnet fisheries were supposed to have been reduced by fifty
percent by December 31, 1992.' The global moratorium was to be
fully implemented by that same date and was to include enclosed
and semi-enclosed seas.49 Despite the Secretary General's
admonishment to all members of the international community to
take measures individually and collectively to stop drifitnet
fishing,5" the target dates have come and gone and driftnetting
problems continue.5 I
The primary weakness of the U.N. resolution is its lack of an
enforcement mechanism. The resolution is enforceable only if
member states pass their own bans on driftnet fishing. 2 This is a
problem common to many international conservation
conventions,53 and it predictably frustrates those who look for strict
enforcement.4 While the United States and many other nations




49 See id. According to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, Article 122,
"enclosed or semi-enclosed sea" means "a gulf, basin, or sea surrounded by two or more
States and connected to another sea or the ocean by a narrow outlet, or consisting
entirely or primarily of the territorial seas and exclusive economic zones of two or more
coastal States." Convention on the Law of the Sea, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982).
50 See Pelagic Driftnet Fishing II, supra note 9, at 241.
51 See infra Part III.B and accompanying text for a discussion of continuing
problems in Europe.
52 See id.
53 See International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 62
Stat. 1716, 161 U.N.T.S. 72.
54 See Scott C. Whitney & Steven R. Perles, Critical Issues Left Unresolved in
Japan Whaling Association v. American Cetacean Society: The Relationship of the
Administrative Procedure Act to the Pelly and Packwood Amendments, 28 VA. J. INT'L
L. 679, 683 (1988).
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have passed national legislation banning drifinets," many others
lag behind.
B. The Wellington Convention
The Wellington Convention was adopted in 1990 by a number
of nations concerned about driftnet fishing in the South Pacific.
The Convention area consists of a large rectangle of ocean that
begins roughly from a point in the Pacific Ocean west of Central
America and runs due west to the Phillipines 6 It then extends
southward to a point south of Australia. 7 The area then bears east
towards the southern part of Chile and closes again to the west of
Central America." Australia, New Zealand, Hawaii, most South
Pacific Islands, and most of Southeast Asia are included in the
Convention area." Parties to the Convention agree to prohibit
their nationals from fishing with driftnets in the above-stated
area.o For fishing outside that area, it sets the maximum length
for driftnets at the international default standard of 2.5
kilometers.6'
The Wellington Convention also has two supplemental
Protocols. 62  Protocol I is open for signature to any state whose
nationals or vessels fish within the Convention area, or any state
invited to join by the Convention members.63 Parties to Protocol I
agree to prohibit their nationals from using driftnets, to transmit to
the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency information on
measures they have implemented, to cooperate with other parties
on managing albacore tuna within the Convention area, and to take
55 See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1826a (1994).
56 See Wellington Convention, supra note 9, at 1455. The precise geographic
coordinates of the Convention area are 10 degrees north latitude to 50 degrees south, and
130 degrees east longitude to 120 degrees west. See id. The area also includes all




60 See id. at 1456.
61 See id. at 1455.
62 See id. at 1462-63.
63 See id. at 1462.
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appropriate enforcement measures.64 In contrast, Protocol II is
only open to Pacific rim countries. 6 It requires parties to prohibit
the use of driftnets in areas under their jurisdiction and to deny
driftnet fishing vessels access to their ports and facilities.'
Parties to the Convention may take various steps to prevent the
use of driftnets. A member state may prohibit the landing of
driftnet catches, the processing of those catches within its territory,
the import of fish caught in driftnets, or restrict port access for
vessels using driftnets.67 Member states are required to ensure fair
application and enforcement of the Convention's provisions.6 ' A
member nation can also request consultations with any nation that
is eligible to become a member, and whose driftnet fishing
activities are adversely affecting the conservation of marine
resources within the Convention area.
69
The South Pacific Forum adopted this Convention in 1990, at
about the same time that the United Nations adopted Resolution
44/225." South Pacific governments passed the treaty primarily as
a response to growing concern for the dwindling albacore tuna
population in the area."
The. United States signed the Wellington Convention on
November 14, 1990, and Protocol I on February 26, 1991.72
Ratification of the Convention was consistent with the U.S.
position on driftnet fishing." The United States became a party to
64 See id.
65 See id. at 1449.
66 See id. at 1463.
67 See id. at 1457.
61 See id.
69 See id. at 1458.
70 See id.; Pelagic Driftnet Fishing II, supra note 9, at 241.
71 See Wellington Convention, supra note 9, at 1449. Some of the Wellington
Convention's first signatories included Australia, the Cook Islands, the Federated States
of Micronesia, the French Republic, the Republic of Kiribati, the Republic of the
Marshall Islands, the Republic of Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, the Republic of Palau,
Tokelau, Tuvalu, the United States of America, and the Republic of Vanuatu. See id. at
1450.
72 See Marian Nash Leich, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 668 (1991).
73 See id. at 669.
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the Convention on the understanding that it would be "obligated to
prohibit drifitnet fishing in all areas of exclusive economic zone
within the Convention Area, and to prohibit all United States
nationals and vessels documented under United States laws from
fishing with driftnets in the Convention Area. 74  The United
States' support for international agreements like the Wellington
Convention and the U.N.'s Driftnet Resolution is mirrored in
tough domestic legislation against driftnets.
III. Current Legal Regimes
A. United States Law
Several years prior to the U.N.'s involvement in the
driftnetting area, Congress took steps to reduce the damage caused
by driftnets in the North Pacific and Bering Sea. The Driftnet
Impact Monitoring, Assessment, and Control Act of 1987
(DIMACA)75 required the Secretary of State to initiate negotiations
with foreign governments conducting driftnet fishing in those
waters.76 In 1990, the same year the U.N. passed Resolution
44/225, Congress expanded the coverage of DIMACA and
expressly proclaimed that its policies were to enforce the
moratorium on driftnet fishing called for by Resolution 44/225, to
support the Wellington Declaration, and to secure a ban on large-
scale driftnets on the high seas. 77
The amended act stated that "the Secretary [of Commerce],
through the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the department
in which the Coast Guard is operating, shall seek to secure
international agreements to implement immediately the findings,
policy, and provisions of this section, and in particular an
international ban on large-scale driftnet fishing."78 To carry out
this directive, the Secretary of Commerce has the duty to insure
74 Id. (quoting letter from Lawrence Eagleburger, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State,
to President George Bush (May 13, 1991)).
75 See Driftnet Impact Monitoring, Assessment, and Control Act of 1987, Pub. L.
No. 100-220, Title IV, 101 Stat. 1477 (1987).
76 See 16 U.S.C. § 1826(c) (1994).
77 See id.
78 Id. § 1826(d).
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that all drifinet-fishing vessels are included in the agreement, that
all vessels are equipped with a satellite transmitter for monitoring,
and that the taking of species are carefully monitored. 9 Further,
United States officials have the right to board and inspect any
vessel using driftnets when the vessel is operating in designated
areas beyond the exclusive economic zone of any nation.0 The
law also requires that all large-scale driftnets be constructed of
biodegradable materials and that they be marked in such a way as
to identify the vessel and flag nation responsible for them."'
DIMACA also created substantial reporting requirements. The
Commerce Secretary must submit an annual report to the
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the
Senate and the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries of
the House of Representatives. 2 The report must include steps
taken to carry out the law and evaluate its progress. 3 The report
also must identify any nation which conducts large-scale driftnet
fishing in a manner inconsistent with any international agreement
to which they and the United States are a party."
DIMACA was followed by the High Seas Driftnet Fisheries
Enforcement Act of 1992 (HSDFEA). 5 This Act required the
Secretary of Commerce to identify by January 10, 1993 each
nation whose nationals or vessels were conducting large-scale
driftnet fishing on the high seas, and to notify the President and
each affected nation. 6 While that deadline has come and gone, the
remainder of the Act is currently in force and is the basis for the
Humane Society's lawsuit against the U.S. Departments of
79 See id.
80 See id. The right is limited to vessels operating under the flag of a party to the
agreement. See id.
81 See id.
82 See 16 U.S.C.S. § 1826 (e) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
83 See id.
84 See id. Any nation so identified is certified to the President, which is deemed a
certification for the purposes of § 8(a) of the Fishermen's Protective Act of 1967. See
id. at § 1826(0.
85 16 U.S.C. § 1826a (1994).
86 See id. § 1826a(b)(l)(A).
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Commerce and State.87
Under the HSDFEA, identification of an offending country
triggers a ninety-day consultation period during which the
President must attempt to persuade the offending country to
immediately halt large-scale driftnetting.88 If the President's
efforts are unsuccessful, he must direct the Secretary of the
Treasury to prohibit imports of fish, fish products, and fishing
equipment from that country. If these sanctions prove ineffective,
the United States may impose an embargo on any product from
that country.89
To comply with U.N. Resolution 46/215, in 1995, Congress
adopted Title VI of the Fisheries Act of 1995, 90 which strengthened
the moratorium on driftnet fishing called for by the Resolution.9'
Title VI bars the United States from entering into any international
agreement relating to the conservation and management of living
marine resources or high seas fishing that would prevent the
implementation of the global moratorium on driftnets required by
the Resolution.92 It also urges the Secretary of State to make use
of international agreements and organizations to implement the
ban,93 and requires the President to use the Department of Defense,
the Coast Guard, and other agencies to prevent violations of the
moratorium in U.S. and international waters.94 This enforcement
applies not only to fisheries under the jurisdiction of the United
States, but also to fisheries not under U.S. jurisdiction to the fullest
extent permitted under international law.95
87 See Humane Soc'y of the United States v. Brown, 901 F. Supp. 338, 341 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1995) (Humane Soc'y I).
88 See 16 U.S.C. § 1826a(b)(2).
89 See id.
90 See 16 U.S.C.S. § 1826d (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
91 See Statement of R. Tucker Scully, Acting Deputy Asst. Secretary for Oceans,
Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Before the
Subcommittee on Fisheries, Wildlife and Oceans Committee on Resources, US. House
of Representatives, Fed. News Service, Sept. 12, 1996, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Curnws File.
92 See 16 U.S.C.S. § 1826d (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
93 See id. § 1826e.
94 See id. § 1826g.
95 See id.
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The United States has enjoyed some success enforcing its
driftnet laws. In 1993, when the Coast Guard found two Chinese
vessels conducting illegal driftnet fishing in international waters in
the north Pacific, the vessels were sent back to China for
prosecution. 96 In 1995, Coast Guard officers seized a vessel 1,500
miles northwest of Midway Island for violating the U.N.
moratorium." Also, in the summer of 1996, a Coast Guard cutter
spent a Week pursuing a Taiwanese vessel caught using a two-mile
long driftnet in international waters southwest of the Aleutian
Islands.98 As the Coast Guard cutter drew near, the fishing boat
cut away its driftnet and sped off.99 The Coast Guard took a six-
foot sample of the net containing two salmon and set off in pursuit
of the vessel.' °  After several days, the fishing boat hoisted a
Taiwanese flag and tossed a message overboard in a bottle. This
message gave the .vessel's name and said that it had stopped
fishing because of a broken freezer.'' Taiwan claimed jurisdiction
over the boat, and refused to allow the U.S. Coast Guard to board
it until Taiwanese police had arrived at the scene, which by now
was near Yokohama.'
The Taiwanese incident underscored one of the primary
problems with enforcement of the driftnet legislation. Pursuant to
international agreement, prosecution of illegal driftnetting is left to
the country of origin, not the capturing couhtry. 3 For example,
the captain of the Taiwanese boat, if convicted, faced a maximum
9 See U.S. Coast Guard Chases Unidentified Drifinet Vessel, Reuters World
Service, July 9, 1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allnws File.
97 Dee Norton, Drift-Net "Pirate" Captured After Seven-Day Chase, SEATTLE
TIMEs, July 21, 1995, at B3, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
98 See Helen Jung, Coast Guard Pursues Driftnetter in 2-day Chase, ANCHORAGE
DAiLY NEWS, July 9, 1996, at 1 A, available in LEXIS, News Library, Anchdn File.
99 See id.
100 See id.
101 See Yereth Rosen, Taiwan Likely to Prosecute its Driftnet Vessel, Reuters N.
Am. Wire, July 11, 1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allnws File.
102 See Taiwan and U.S. Officials Search Taiwanese Driftnet Trawler, Deutsche
Presse-Agentur, July 14, 1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, DPA File
[hereinafter Taiwanese Driftnet Trawler].
103 See Danielle Stanton, High-Seas Chase Ends Peacefully, ANCHORAGE DALY
NEWS, July 14, 1996, at IB, available in LEXIS, News Library, Anchdn File.
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three-year sentence and loss of the boat's fishing license.'/4 But it
was unknown how seriously the captain's offense would be treated
in Taiwan. While Taiwan has been using police boats to enforce
the U.N. drifinet ban in the north Pacific,' 5 it is not a U.N. member
state, nor is it a signatory to any driftnet accord.0 6 Preliminary
investigations of the vessel failed to turn up any evidence of illegal
drifinetting-not surprising since the captain had a week to
dispose of any incriminating materials."7 Republican Senator
Frank Murkowski of Alaska said that this was a good reason for
talks between the United States and Taiwan to implement a new
fisheries treaty that would allow parties to search each others'
boats when violations were suspected.' 8
B. Driftnetting in Europe
The European Union has yet to agree to a ban on driftnet
fishing. Although it has already made driftnets longer than 2.5
kilometers illegal, some member nations refuse to outlaw them
completely.' ° The failure can be traced to historic disagreement
among members of the European Union on the need for a total
driftnet ban. The current proposal, originally drafted in April
1994, would ban all driftnets in the northeast Atlantic,
Mediterranean, and Baltic Seas."0 But its adoption has been
blocked consistently by France, the United Kingdom, Ireland,
Italy, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and Germany."' These
countries have traditionally claimed that scientific research does
104 See Taiwanese Driftnet Trawler, supra note 102.
1o5 See id.
106 See U.S. Senator Urges Taiwan to Renew Fisheries Agreement with U.S.,
Agence France Presse, July 15, 1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allnws File.
107 See id.
108 See id.
'09 See Spain & Portugal: Commission Proposes New Access Plans for Iberian
Fishermen, Agri Service Int'l, June 9, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws
File. The European Fisheries Commission has come out squarely on the side of banning
driftnets. See id. As support for its position, the Commission argues that an estimated
twenty percent of total annual fisheries output is lost through illegal fishing. See id.
10 See Fisheries: Euro-MPS Probe Plans to Phase Out Italian Drifnets, EUR. REP.,
Apr. 5, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Eurrpt File [hereinafter Phase Out].
I' See id.
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not support the necessity for such a ban."'2
Recent developments, however, suggest that a complete ban is
near, and may occur sometime in 1998. In a dramatic reversal of
policy, the United Kingdom announced on October 30, 1997 that it
would support a total ban on driftnets during 1998, the year of its
presidency in the European Union.' 3 Moreover, the United
Kingdom's abrupt about-face means that "for the first time in




But dissenting nations are not likely to accept a ban without a
fight. In addition to their scientific arguments that a ban is not
necessary, these nations have complained about the practical
difficulties involved in enforcing an absolute ban. For example,
Ireland recently passed legislation banning monofilament driftnets
for salmon fishing, but the Minister of State for the Marine found
that the ban was too expensive and was unenforceable. "5 He
claimed that other less severe measures would provide for simpler,
more realistic enforcement.'16 Some of the alternatives suggested
by the Minister included postponing the opening date of
driftnetting season, limiting fishing to four days a week during
daylight hours only, and banning driftnets outside a six mile limit
to make it simpler for regional fisheries boards to enforce the
measures." 7 The Irish Fisherman's Organization favored the
initiative, claiming that legal driftnetting may not be the main
112 See Marine Resources: Spain Plans to End Driftnet Fishing in E. U. Waters, Eur.
Env't., July 11, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
113 See Fisheries Council: Britain to Push for Driftnet Ban, EuR. REP., Nov. 1,
1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Eurrpt File; Amanda Brown, UK to Back
Phasing Out of Drift-Nets, Press Ass'n Ltd., Oct. 30, 1997, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Curnws File.
114 Fisheries: Bonino and Cunningham Plan for UK Presidency, EuR. REP., Nov.
26, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Eurrpt File; see also Fisheries: New Aid
Regime Agreed for Tuna Processing, EUR. REP., Feb. 4, 1998, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Eurrpt File (celebrating the fact that the European Union could finally
"generate the necessary votes at in [sic] the EU's Council of Ministers for a ban on
driftnets" in 1998).
115 See Lorna Siggins, Ban on Type of Net Cannot be Enforced - Gilmore, IRISH
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cause of the perceived decline in salmon stocks."8
The European Union has tried to improve enforcement of
fisheries laws. In June 1995, the European Fisheries Commission
chartered a British fisheries inspection vessel to patrol tuna driftnet
fishing in the northeast Atlantic and Mediterranean." 9  The
European Union hoped that the vessel's presence might help
discourage violence between boats from Spain and Portugal,
which use traditional fishing methods, and those from France,
Britain, and Ireland, which use driftnets.'2 Two E.U. inspectors
patrol the seas on this boat, ensuring that fishermen comply with
the 2.5 kilometer limit on driftnet length.'' The boat also carries
E.U. inspectors from member states who want to check on their
own country's vessels. 22
The European Fisheries Commission has also formulated a
plan to monitor fishing vessels with a satellite surveillance system
(VMS). 3 The masters of the vessels are supposed to ensure that
the system is working and specified information is being
transmitted to the proper location. n4  Each member state is
supposed to establish a "Fisheries Monitoring Centre" to monitor
the activities of both its own vessels, wherever they might be, and
vessels of other countries fishing in waters under its jurisdiction. 5
The member states are supposed to record the data received from
their vessels and the Fisheries Commission has direct access to
these files.2 6 The system will go into effect transitionally in July
1998 and apply to all E.U. vessels over-twenty meters in length as
"1 See id. While the particular fishing at issue here does not occur on the high seas
and therefore is not part of the international moratorium, the debate is indicative of the
country's attitudes toward driftnetting in general.
"9 See Spain & Portugal, supra note 109.
120 See id.; see also infra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
121 See id.
122 See id. The boat can also be used for fisheries research and to provide medical
support for fishing vessels. See id.
123 See Fisheries Council: Ministers Agree Satellite Tracking System for Trawlers,






HUMANE Soc'Y AND ITALIAN DRrNFrrTING
of January 2000. '27
Irish Fisheries Minister Sean Barrett said that he hoped that the
VMS system would usher in a new era of fisheries enforcement.'
He hoped that the VMS would have "a significant impact in
reducing the level of illegal activities in E.U. waters and ensuring
the fishing vessels across the [European Union] are monitored in a
more uniform and comprehensive fashion."'29 While the satellite
system will only be able to show the location of boats, and not
what they are doing,'30 the Fisheries Ministers believe that the
system will be "cheaper than building more inspection boats and
will allow much more efficient communication between vessels
and fisheries protection agencies.'3'
Although European nations are trying to work together to
establish a satisfactory fisheries policy, there have been clashes
between fishermen who disagree about the best fishing methods.
Spain is violently opposed to the use of drifinets on the high
seas. Spanish fishermen, who use the traditional hook and line
method to catch fish,' have a history of violent clashes with
fishing boats from France, Britain, and Ireland, which use
driftnets.
114
These clashes occur mostly in the Atlantic, but the
Mediterranean is also the scene of altercations involving
driftnetters. Italy has continued to use driftnets of up to twenty
kilometers long in its Mediterranean swordfish fleet, despite the
E.U. ban on driftnets longer than 2.5 kilometers."' In June 1996,
fifteen out of sixteen Italian boats were using driftnets averaging






132 See Fisheries Council: Ministers Agree New Fishing Effort Plans, Agri Service
Int'l, June 23, 1995, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Eurasi File.
133 See id.
134 See id.
135 See Bonino, supra note 11.
136 See id.
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legal limits are not economically viable, the fishermen had a
strong incentive to ignore the rules. 37
The Italian government's reluctance to enforce the driftnet ban
is fueled in part by a concern that a ban would threaten two to
three thousand fishing jobs in southern Italy, an area already
crippled by a high unemployment rate."' The Italian government
also contended that fishing in Italy was controlled by organized
crime, which made the industry difficult for the government to
control. 39  Finally, Italy maintained that if it were to accept a
driftnet ban, it would require E.U. assistance to help fishermen
retire or be retrained in other livelihoods.'4°
Despite the Italian government's protests, illegal fishing
continues to be a major problem. A recent Food and Agriculture
Organization report concluded that the primary region of illegal
fishing was the Mediterranean, and most of that fishing was being
done by Italian vessels. 4' In addition, scientific studies have
shown that about eighty percent of what the Italian fleet catches in
driftnets is bycatch-dolphins, whales, sharks, and unwanted




'40 See Satellite Tracking, supra note 123. The Italian government also claimed
that other countries, including Japan, South Korea, Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey, Algeria,
Malta, and Albania, continue to use driftnets in the Mediterranean. See Bonino, supra
note 11.
The European Fisheries Commission attributed illegal fishing in the Mediterranean
to the fact that exclusive economic zones do not extend the full 200 miles allowable,
which made it difficult to control both Italian fishermen and foreign boats which use the
same waters. See Phase Out, supra note 110.
141 See John Hooper, Mafia Fishing Fleets Face Trade Ban, GUARDIAN (London),
Mar. 19, 1996, at 12, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. Greenpeace
started attacking the Italian swordfish fleet for driftnet violations in 1995. See Marine
Resources, supra note 112; Claire Springett, Greenpeace Accuses Italy of Killing
Dolphins, Reuters N. Am. Wire, July 4, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Reuna
File. The organization complained that the Italian fishermen had been indiscriminately
killing thousands of dolphins and other marine mammals. See Phase Out, supra note
110.
142 See Phase Out, supra note 110.
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Only one-fifth of the haul is actually the targeted swordfish.43
IV. The CIT: A History of Environmental Friendliness
While U.S. and U.N. laws present a solid front against
driftnetting, enforcement has always lagged a step behind. Private
environmental groups have quickly grown tired of waiting for
results. The Humane Society of the United States, dissatisfied
with the United States' reluctance to impose sanctions on Italy,
decided to challenge the U.S. inaction in the CIT.'"
A. Florsheim Shoe Co. v. United States
The decision to seek relief in the CIT may have been spurred
by two earlier CIT decisions favorable to environmental
organizations. In Florsheim Shoe Co. v. United States, ' 41 plaintiffs
challenged the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service's denial of entry of
elk skin shoes imported by Florsheim from Taiwan' 46 The U.S.
prohibition was based on the Pelly Amendment to the Fishermen's
Protective Act of 1967,14 which authorizes restrictions on imports
of products from countries whose trade practices threaten
143 See id.
144 See infra notes 145-72 and accompanying text. Environmental groups have
tried the same enforcement tactic in other courts, but with less success. In 1986, the
American Cetacean Society tried to force the Secretary of Commerce to certify Japan
under the Pelly Amendment, see Pelly Amendment to the Fisherman's Protective Act of
1967, 22 U.S.C. § 1978 (1982), for violating the International Whaling Convention
(IWC). See Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 228 (1986).
Like the driftnet resolutions, the IWC lacks authority to enforce its measures and relies
on member states to implement their own enforcement mechanisms. See Whitney &
Perles, supra note 54, at 683. The Supreme Court held, contrary to the plaintiff's
position, that the Secretary of Commerce had the option of either certifying the
offending nation, with the accompanying threat of sanctions, or entering into a more
conciliatory executive agreement with the country. See Japan Whaling, 478 U.S. at 241;
Whitney & Perles, supra note 54, at 683. Instead of threatening sanctions, the United
States chose to enter a phase-out agreement with Japan whereby Japan agreed to cease
commercial whaling by 1988. In fact, Japan continued to catch a large number of
whales for supposedly non-commercial uses. See Whitney & Perles, supra note 54, at
680-81.
145 880 F. Supp. 848 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1995).
146 See id. at 849.
147 See 22 U.S.C. § 1978 (1967).
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endangered species.4 ' Taiwan had already been certified under the
Pelly Amendment for violating the Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora because it
continued to trade in rhinoceros and tiger parts and products.'49
The Pelly Amendment authorizes the President to prohibit the
importation of any products from the offending country.'"0
The President proposed an embargo of goods from Taiwan in
November 1993 and gave Taiwan an opportunity to change its
practices regarding endangered species.' By August 1994, the
President prohibited the importation of certain fish and wildlife
parts and products from Taiwan.'52 Two months later, the Fish and
Wildlife Service seized elk skin shoes manufactured in Taiwan
from imported Finnish leather as articles barred under the
Proclamation.'53
Florsheim, the importer of the shoes, argued that the embargo
should not cover these shoes because the shoes were made from
animals that did not come from Taiwan.54 Florsheim contended
that the words "of Taiwan" were intended to modify "wildlife,"
and as such the embargo should only extend to products made
from animals native to Taiwan.' The CIT rejected this argument,
holding that Florsheim's reading of the statute would effectively
render it inoperative.'56 Instead, the CIT applied the ban to all
wildlife products from Taiwan, regardless of where the animals
came from.'57
B. Earth Island v. Christopher
The next major environmental case before the CIT was Earth









157 See id. at 851-53.
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Island v. Christopher.' Earth Island established the CIT as the
leading forum for legal disputes involving international trade
issues.13 It also set an important precedent on the standing of
environmental plaintiffs, o holding that plaintiffs seeking review
of U.S. government actions do have standing to sue as long as the
remedy sought is likely to further the plaintiffs' specific
interests. 6'
Earth Island involved the enforcement of legislation passed by
Congress to protect endangered sea turtles. 62 The law required the
Secretary of Commerce to prohibit importation of shrimp products
from countries that have failed to implement protective measures
to protect sea turtles comparable to the protection afforded under
U.S. law.'63 The regulation was designed to apply to all countries,
but the State Department added language limiting the geographic
scope of the law to nations in the western Atlantic and
Caribbean.'6 While the stated purpose of.this limiting language
was to apply the law only to sea turtles in or migrating through
U.S. waters, the actual purpose was the Bush and Clinton
administrations' desire to avoid international trade disputes that
could undermine the adoption of GATT and NAFTA.
16
In February 1992, Earth Island Institute, a non-governmental
organization whose goal is to protect sea turtles, filed suit in
federal court, challenging the State Department's right to limit the
application of the law.'6 The State'Department contended that the
158 913 F. Supp. 559 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1995).
159 See Paul Stanton Kibel, Justice for the Sea Turtle: Marine Conservation and the
Court of International Trade, 15 UCLA J. ENV'T L. & POL'Y 57, 58 (1996-97).
160 See id. at 72 (quoting an Earth Island attorney: "This decision clearly established
environmental plaintiffs' right to seek judicial enforcement of U.S. laws aimed at the
global protection of threatened and endangered animals.").
161 See Earth Island, 913 F. Supp. at 567.
162 See id. at 561-62. The legislation is Pub. L. No. 101-162, 103 Stat. 988 (1989).
See id. at 561. It was passed in connection with the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C.
§ 1531 (1973). See id.
163 See id.
164 See Kibel, supra note 159 at 63 (citing Public Notice, 58 Fed. Reg. 9,015-16
(1993)).
165 See id. at 64.
166 See id.
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federal district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and that the
CIT was the proper forum, with exclusive jurisdiction over cases
involving import and export restrictions."7 The district court
agreed and dismissed the case.16
Earth Island had no choice but to bring its case before the CIT.
It did so with some trepidation because the CIT judges were
known to be "trade experts" who seemed unlikely to care about
environmental protection, especially if it came at the cost of free
trade. 169  To everyone's surprise, the CIT found that the
government's failure to implement its laws was a threat to Earth
Island's demonstrated interest in turtle preservation, so Earth
Island did have standing to pursue the matter.'70 The CIT then
found that the State Department's interpretation of the new law
was an invalid limitation on the scope of the statute.7 ' Lastly, the
CIT ordered the State Department to comply with the law by
prohibiting the importation of shrimp from countries that had not
reduced sea turtle mortality from shrimp fishing by ninety-seven
percent.7 2
C. Humane Society v. Brown
Perhaps based in part on the good fortune enjoyed by other
environmental groups, the Humane Society also decided to file its
Italian driftnet suit in the CIT in an attempt to force the U.S.
government to impose sanctions on Italy as required under the
HSDFEA. "' The plaintiffs hoped enforcement of a driftnet ban
167 See id.
16s See id. at 68.
169 See id. at 67. Environmentalists feared that the CIT would have the same
attitudes as the GATT dispute panel that ruled that a U.S. law banning the import of tuna
caught in driftnets was in violation of international trade rules. See id.
170 See Earth Island v. Christopher, 913 F. Supp. 559, 567 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1995).
171 See id. at 578-79.
172 See id. at 579-80.
173 See Carol Vinzant, Environmentalists Sue U.S. over Drifinet Sanctions, Reuters
World Service, May 4, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File. The
Humane Society of the United States was joined in this action by Humane Society
International, Defenders of Wildlife, Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals, Whale and Dolphin Conservation Society, and Earth Island Institute. See
Humane Soc'y of the United States v. Brown, 901 F. Supp. 338 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1995)
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would convince the European Union to ban driftnets altogether
and to help establish net buy-back programs in Italy.'74
Procedurally, the Humane Society maintained that it had
standing to sue in this matter because Humane Society members
derive great benefit from watching wildlife, including whales and
dolphins, and that large-scale driftnet fishing harms their members
because it kills the animals they enjoy watching.'75 The plaintiffs
then alleged that Italy had a large Mediterranean fleet that
continued to use driftnets longer than 2.5 kilometers, in
contravention of UN Resolutions 44/225 and 46/215, and argued
that the HSDFEA required the Commerce Department to initiate
negotiations with Italy and possibly impose sanctions on its
exports.
176
The defendants countered that the HSDFEA mandated such
action only if the Secretary of Commerce "has reason to believe"
that unacceptable driftnet fishing is occurring, 177 and that the
Secretary had no such information.7 7 The CIT disagreed,
however, finding that the Commerce Department had ample
reason to identify Italy under the HSDFEA.77 The CIT also
believed that enforcing the Act would reduce the mortality of
cetaceans caught in drifnets by forcing the Italian government to
end the driftnet fishing industry.'
The plaintiffs completed their victory in February 1996, when
the CIT ruled that the Commerce and State Departments must
declare officially that Italy was violating the ban on driftnet
fishing.'' The plaintiffs had essentially forced the U.S.
(Humane Soc'y I). The defendants, Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown and Secretary of
State Warren Christopher, were being sued in their official capacities for failing to
enforce the High Seas Driftnet Fisheries Enforcement Act. See id. at 341.
174 See Vinzant, supra note 173.
17 See Humane Soc "y L 901 F. Supp. at 341.
176 See id. at 342; 16 U.S.C. §§ 1826a(b)(1)(B), (b)(3)(A)(ii) (1992).
177 Humane Soc'y of the United States v. Brown, 920 F. Supp. 178, 191 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1996) (Humane Soc'y II).
178 See id. at 192.
179 See id. at 195.
180 See id. at 204-05.
181 See Humane Soc'y of the United States v. Brown, No. 95-05-00631, Slip Op.
96-55, 1996 WL 132988 (Ct. Int'l Trade Mar. 18, 1996) (Humane Soc'y III); see also
1998]
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government's hand. As a result of the CIT's order, the Commerce
Department gave Italy ninety days to agree to stop its fishermen
from using driftnets longer than 2.5 kilometers or face restrictions
on U.S. imports of fish and fish products."2 However, the
Commerce Department expected Italy to avoid any sanctions. 3
Subsequent to the court's holding, the Italian government
committed itself to improving enforcement of its own and
European Union driftnet laws.'" As of July 1996, Italy had
formulated a plan to eliminate its driftnet fleet. At that time, it was
unclear whether the United States actually would enforce its
sanctions against Italy, but the European Fisheries Commissioner
Emma Bonino decided to take the threat seriously. 5 Talk of a
plan to eliminate the fleet has predictibly aroused the ire of
fishermen in southern Italy, who fear the severe economic
consequences the ban could have on an already depressed
186
economy.
Italy's plan attempted to soften the blow to the Italian fishing
industry, offering financial incentives to vessels and fishermen
who abandon their nets. 7 The plan will cost ECU 100 million
over three years.' It targets 680 boats and almost 3,000
fishermen in the Adriatic and Ionian Seas. 9 Experts hope that
France, Ireland, and Britain might also be persuaded to stop using
driftnets when Italy gets rid of its fleet.'90
Humane Society, in conjunction with the prior Florsheim and
Earth Island decisions, 191 solidified the CIT's position as an
Thomas W. Lippman, Italy Faces Cutoff of Exports to U.S., WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 1996,
at A24.
182 See U.S. Expects Italy Will Enforce Driftnet Ban, Reuter Fin. Service, Mar. 29,
1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.
183 See id.
18 See id.
185 See Bonino, supra note 11.
186 See id.
187 See Phase Out, supra note 110.
188 See id.
189 See id.
190 See Bonino, supra note 11.
191 See supra notes 145-72 and accompanying text. See generally Florsheim Shoe
Co. v. United States, 880 F. Supp. 848 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1995) (ordering the prohibition
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effective forum for claims brought by environmental activist
groups. Some experts see the CIT as "an important new forum for
enforcing international standards protecting endangered
species."'' The CIT is currently the leading judicial forum for
issues involving trade-based environmental restrictions.'
IV. Conclusion
By using domestic courts to force the government to uphold its
own laws, environmental activist groups have found a new way of
fighting for their goals. There is no doubt that one country can
influence the policies of the international community. Hilary
French, Senior Researcher at the World Watch Institute, said, "[I]t
is most often a unilateral action by one country, sometimes backed
by trade measures against others, that eventually spurs the
international community to act collectively."'' Similarly,
Professor Kibel noted that "in the field of international
environmental diplomacy, the progressive policies of individual
countries can serve as a catalyst to global awareness and
consensus."'95  The Humane Society and other environmental
activists who have used the CIT to enforce environmental
regulations have taken advantage of this fact. The U.S.
government is often reluctant to take a strong stance on
environmental issues for fear of damaging trade relationships, but
environmental groups have now found a way to require the
government to enforce its laws. Situations such as the Italian
driftnet case show how one country, pushed by its concerned
citizens, can influence the development of both customary
international law and actual statutory law.
of "the importation of shrimp or products from shrimp wherever harvested in the wild
with commercial fishing technology which may affect adversely those species of sea
turtles the conservation of which is the subject of regulation"); Earth Island v.
Christopher, 922 F. Supp. 616 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1996) (finding that "denial of entry of elk
skin shoes imported by plaintiff from Taiwan was proper" under the Fisherman's
Protective Act).
192 Paget & Srolovic, supra note 18, at S1.
193 See Kibel, supra note 159, at 58.
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However, there is another side to the practice of using
unilateral actions to enforce norms of international law. While
U.S. environmental groups now have a forum sympathetic to their
causes, it is only part of the battle. The executive branch' 96 may
bristle at judicial mandates to impose sanctions against other
countries, even if such sanctions may be required by statute. In
the case of the Italian drifinetters, the Commerce Department has
yet to take any real action against Italy even though years have
passed since the CIT's decision.'97 The federal government fears
international trade repercussions if it violates World Trade
Organization obligations.98
Because of the government's reluctance, there is no guarantee
that Italy will eliminate its driftnet fleet. The Italian driftnet plan
remains vague and does not clearly specify how the financial
incentives would work.'" Moreover, the proposal includes no
guarantee that any replacement method of fishing will solve the
base issue of overfishing.2°° Nor does the proposed plan address
the problem of third-country vessels, such as those from Taiwan
and Korea, that continue to use driftnets in the area.'
The Commerce Department has a history of using the threat of
sanctions to encourage compliance by other nations, and in some
cases this ploy has been effective.0 2 But if Congress is satisfied
with the Commerce Department's enforcement methods, it would
not keep passing stronger enforcement provisions, such as the
HSDFEA.
In the last decade, Congress has strengthened driftnet
enforcement provisions. The HSDFEA, for example, gives the
Secretary of Commerce less discretion in enforcement than existed
19 Sensitive matters concerning international relations have traditionally been the
province of the executive.
197 See Phase Out, supra note 110.
198 See id.
199 See id. In 1981, in a similarly unclear move, Taiwan chose to avoid U.S.
sanctions by banning its nationals from whaling. See id.
200 See id.
201 See id.
202 See Whitney & Perles, supra note 54, at 684 n.34.
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in prior legislation.2 3 This is helpful to those who want to see
stricter environmental regulation worldwide, but it is also
somewhat coercive; using the United States' enormous economic
weight to force other countries to change their environmental
ways. For the United States to put its muscular unilateralism
ahead of international goodwill is dubious policy. There is always
the danger that the executive branch will oppose strong legislation
through Presidential vetoes, or that Congress will remove some of
the enforcement provisions from existing laws. Were the
executive branch to balk, however, the opposition to the clear
voice of Congress, and therefore the people of the United States,
might threaten the domestic balance of power.
Humane Society and its aftermath have raised a number of
difficult issues in international environmental law. While U.S.
citizens, courts, and Congress all appear supportive of strong
enforcement legislation, the executive branch, which must balance
international trade obligations with U.S. environmental interests,
remains reluctant to bow to domestic forces in the international
arena.
Nonetheless, the current trend in international environmental
policy is toward stronger enforcement of laws. In the wake of the
U.N. driftnet resolutions, regional groups have implemented treaty
organizations such as the Wellington Convention.204 The European
Union is struggling with fisheries issues and moving closer to a
total ban on long driftnets.0 5 The United States has passed strong
anti-driftnet legislation.2 6 In the CIT, Congress has graciously
granted a sympathetic forum for disgruntled environmentalists.2 7
Although the executive branch is reluctant to take too hard a line
in international trade, it has threatened sanctions against Italian
fish products.2 8 This has given impetus to Italy and the rest of the
European Union to change their driftnet policies.
203 See Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986).
204 See supra notes 56-74 and accompanying text.
205 See supra notes 109-43 and accompanying text.
206 See supra notes 75-108 and accompanying text.
207 See supra notes 144-93 and accompanying text.
208 See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
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In sum, though unilateral action by the United States in
international environmental law has certain problems, it can be an
effective means of improving global environmental regulation. By
keeping the executive foot to the fire, environmental activist
groups may continue to increase their presence in international
environmental affairs.
